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Vaccines, School Mandates,
and California's Right to Education
Dorit Rubinstein Reiss
ABSTRACT
California recently enacted Senate Bill 277, which abolishes the personal beliefs
exemption to school immunization requirements. One possible challenge to the law's
constitutionality is that it impermissibly limits the right to education. this Essay rebuts
such a position. California's jurisprudence regarding access to education applies to
protected categories; it does not limit the ability of the state to impose health and
safety regulations such as immunization requirements. Moreover, the requirement
would withstand even strict scrutiny, if applied, because disease prevention in the school
context is a compelling interest and there is no alternative that is as effective. Finally,
the law actually protects the right of access to education for those whose parents do not
have the luxury of choice, such as immune-compromised children, while still reasonably
preserving parental choice overall.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 30, 2015, California governor Jerry Brown signed into law Senate
Bill 277 (SB 277),1 which abolished the state's personal belief exemption (PBE)
to school immunization requirements. Like all states, California requires that
children attending school be immunized. California's statute applies to both
public and private daycares and schools and as of July 2015 requires immuniza-
tion against ten preventable, dangerous diseases.2 Before SB 277 was passed, the
PBE allowed parents to send their children to school despite having declined
some or all of the required vaccines. Initially, all that was required was signing a
form expressing an objection to vaccination based on undefined personal beliefs.
PBE rates have gone up dramatically since 1994. In 1994, schools on aver-
age had 0.6 percent of kindergarten students daiming PBE; by 2009, the number
was 2.3 percent.3 By the 2013-2014 school year, schools, on average, had 3.15
percent of kindergarten students claiming PBE.4 While these percentages may
seem low, they are not evenly distributed: Some communities have much higher
rates, and a recent research paper demonstrated that those communities were
most vulnerable to outbreaks.'
1. S.B. 277, 2015-16 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal 2015), ch. 35, 2015 Cal. Stat. 91,
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/15-16/bill/sen/sb 0251-0300/sb 277 bill 20150630 chaptered.pdf;
see also Letter from Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Gov'r of Calif., to the Members of the
California State Senate (June 30,2015), http://gov.ca.gov/docs/SB 277 Signing-Message.pdf.
2. CAL. HEALTH &SAFETY CODE § 120335(b) (West 2012).
3. Jennifer L. Richards et al., Nonmedical Exemptions to Immunization Requirements in California: A
16-Year LongitudinalAnalysis of Trends andAssociated Community Factors, 31 VACCINE 3009, 3011
(2013). This represents an average increase of 8.8 percent each year.
4. CAL. DEP'T HEALTH, IMMUNIZATION BRACH, 2014-2015 KINDERGARTEN
IMMUNIZATION ASSESSMENT RESULTS (Feb. 2015), https://www.cdph.ca.gov/programs/
immunize/Documents/2014-150 2OCA0 2OKindergarten0 2Olmmunizationo2OAssessment.pdf.
Between the 2013-2014 school year and the 2014-2015 school year, however, that number declined
to 2.54 percent.
5. Maimuna S. Majumder et al., Substandard Vaccination Compliance and the 2015 Measles Outbreak,
169 JAMA PEDIATRICS 494,494 (2015).
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As of January 2014, following a bill passed in 2012, an informational re-
quirement was imposed on the then-available exemption. Assembly Bill 21096
required parents to obtain the signature of a healthcare provider-broadly de-
fined to include school nurses, certain naturopaths, and others, in addition to
doctors of osteopathic medicine (DOs) and medical doctors (MDs)-attesting
that the parents were given information about the risks of vaccine-preventable
diseases before making the decision not to vaccinate their child.7 This essentially
constituted a requirement of informed rtusal8 In the year following AB 2109,
the percentage of PBEs in kindergarten decreased by 19 percent (from 3.15 per-
cent to 2.54 percent), but the overall immunization rates went up only slightly.9
During the hearings, Senator Richard Pan explained that experience from Wash-
ington State suggests hat while their informed refusal law initially decreased the
rate of PBE, that trend stalled. In other words, informed refusal laws do not suffi-
ciently increase vaccination rates.0
Under SB 277, children will only be able to attend school or daycare, public
or private, if they either receive the immunizations required by law or obtain a
medical exemption from the requirement from a licensed physician-meaning
only MDs and DOs.11 Children may also be conditionally accepted into a school
or daycare program if they are in the process of completing a series of vaccina-
tions. In other words, if parents wish to leave their children unvaccinated, absent
6 AB. 2109,2011-12 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012), ch. 821, 2012 Cal. Stat. 94 (codified as amended
at CAL. HEALTH &SAFETY CODE § 120365 (West 2012)), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-
12/bilI/asm/ab 2101-2150/ab 2109 bill 20120930 chaptered.pdf.
7. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 120365(b), (0.
8 See Ross D. Silverman, No More Kidding Around" Restructuring Non-Medical Childhood
Immunization Exemptions to Ensure Public Health Protection, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 277, 294
(2003) ("[A]ny applicant wishing to apply for an exemption should be required to undergo
an 'informed refusal' process. Prior to receiving an exemption, applicants would meet
with a health professional (e.g. public health officer, school nurse, or primary care
provider) to discuss the relative risks and benefits of immunization and exemption. This
interaction would need to be memorialized on a standardized form.").
9. CAL. DEPT HEALTH, supra note 4.
10. See WASH. STATE DEPT OF HEALTH, WASHINGTON STATE SCHOOL IMMUNIZATION DATA:
SCHOOL YEAR 2014-2015 (Apr. 2015), http://www.doLwa.gov/Portals/1/Documents/Pubs/348-
246 -SY2014-15 -ImmunizationGraphs.pdf.
11. Section 120370 determines the requirements for a medical exemption, which require that a
physician write a statement "to the effect that the physical condition of the child is such, or medical
circumstances relating to the child are such, that immunization is not considered safe, indicating
the specific nature and probable duration of the medical condition or circumstances that
contraindicate immunization." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120370 (West 2012). SB 277
added a requirement that the doctor consider medical history, though it's undear what effect that
will have, if any. The provision seems to give doctors broad discretion to grant medical
exemptions, and there is currently no real path to oversee that discretion.
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an acknowledged medical reason to do so, they cannot send them to school or
daycare. They will, however, have a variety of other options available. These op-
tions include homeschooling their children on their own or in collaboration with
a few other families, or participating in certain independent study programs of-
fered by public schools.
Opponents of the bill and critics of vaccines fought (and continue to fight)
vigorously against SB 277, sometimes with disturbing tactics.12 One recurrent
theme was that the bill is unconstitutional. This Essay does not address the daim
that SB 277 violates the federal constitution, as this subject has been thoroughly
discussed elsewhere, and our jurisprudence is consistent in upholding school im-
munization requirements with no nonmedical exemptions.13 Instead, I focus on
the daim that the bill is unconstitutional under state law because it violates a
child's right to access public education, which has been acknowledged by the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court to be a fundamental societal interest.14 Part I explains
why Serrano v. Priest"5 and subsequent cases addressing Serrano's holding-in re-
lation both to equal protection and to access to education-do not support the
application of strict scrutiny to SB 277. In reality, Serrano has never been used to
limit the state's ability to ensure the health and safety of children in schools; these
are a precondition to education, and our jurisprudence treats them as such. At-
tempting to use Serrano to attack a health and safety requirement goes against
both the letter of the ruling and its spirit.
Part II addresses the compelling interest test, showing that even if strict scru-
tiny were applied, SB 277 would meet the standard. Part III examines whether a
right of unvaccinated children to access schools and daycare services would create
an increased risk of outbreaks that puts others at risk, induding those who cannot
be vaccinated. This in turn could be construed as limiting medically exempt chil-
dren's rightful access to education, by requiring such naturally vulnerable popula-
12. See Anna Merlan, Meet the New, Dangerous Fringe of the Anti- Vaccination Movement,
JEZEBEL (June 29, 2015, 12:50 PM), http://jezebel.com/meet-the-new-dangerous-fringe-
of-the-anti-vaccination-1713438567 [http://perma.cc/Z26A-WGEM]; Orac, Revealing the
True Face of the Antivaccine Movement, RESPECTFUL INSOLENCE (Jun. 30, 2015),
http://scienceblogs.com/insolence/2015/06/30/revealing-the-true-face-of-the-antivaccine-
movement [http://perma.cc/WQ8M -L8TQ].
13. See Dorit Rubinstein Reiss & Lois A. Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination Crisis:
Legal Frameworks and Tools in the Context of Parental Vaccine Refusal, 63 BUFF. L. REV.
(forthcoming Aug. 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2574001; see generally Dorit Rubinstein Reiss,
Thou Shalt Not Take the Name f the Lord Thy God in Vain: Use andAbuse f Religious Exemptions
From SchoolImmunization Reqirements, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1551 (2014).
14. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano/), 487 P.2d 1241, 1255 (Cal. 1971).
15. Id.
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tions to avoid areas with low vaccination rates. Between families that have a
choice to vaccinate and those that do not, those with no choice have the stronger
claim to access. Finally, Part IV points out that if homeschooling is a legitimate
educational option in California, then parents choosing to reject school require-
ments are not denied a choice. Rather, they are choosing between following the
health and safety rules the state has adopted and exercising their right to reject
those rules. From every angle examined, SB 277 does not violate California's
Constitution as interpreted in Serrano.
I. SERRANO V. PRIESTAND THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION
A. The Three Serrano Cases ProtectAccess to Education for Suspect
Categories
In a set of cases that were heard by California's Supreme Court three times,
plaintiffs challenged the financing of California's school system by claiming that
discrimination based on wealth violated equal protection. In the initial case, the
Supreme Court overturned the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss, ruling
that the state's financing system did, indeed, violate the Fourteenth Amendment
by discriminating based on wealth. The court emphasized that in instances of
wealth-based discrimination, courts traditionally evaluate the existence of a fun-
damental interest, explaining that "[u]ntil the present time wealth classifications
have been invalidated only in conjunction with a limited number of fundamental
interests-rights of defendants in criminal cases . . . and voting rights."16 The
court found education to be such a fundamental interest.7
The court went on to discuss the "indispensable role which education plays
in the modern industrial state.""8 The Serrano court highlighted the importance
of education, both to the individual and her participation in modern society and
to society itself.19 The court based its analysis, to a large extent, on a thorough le-
gal review discussing the importance of education in modern society and offering
16. Serrano , 487 P.2d 1241, 1255 (citations omitted). This point was reaffirmed in Serrano v. Priest
(Serrano 1), 557 P.2d 929, 948 (Cal. 1976) (explaining that the school financing system "involved
both a 'suspect classification' (because the discrimination in question was made on the basis of
wealth) and affected a 'fimdamental interest' (education)").
17. Serrano _, 487 P2d 1241, 1255.
18. Id. at 1256.
19. Id. at 1256-59 (citations omitted).
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compelling arguments in support of acknowledging education as a fundamental
interest.2"
Serrano justifiably stands for the importance of education under California's
constitutional law. But it is important to remember that the decision was made
in the context of examining whether wealth was a suspect classification that justi-
fied applying strict scrutiny to the state's school financing system. In other words,
the emphasis on education was raised not in the abstract-not to provide for
strict scrutiny every time the state attempts to regulate schools-but to prevent
the state from limiting access to education based on a suspect classification.
B. Post-SerranoJurisprudence
What does subsequent jurisprudence t ach us about Serrano? There are two
ways in which it clearly does not support the argument that SB 277 is unconstitu-
tional under Serrano. First, children intentionally unvaccinated do not constitute
a suspect dassification that may be entitled to strict scrutiny in the context of lim-
iting access to education. Second, if anything, post-Serrano cases have upheld the
state's ability to regulate the school environment for safety. They certainly do
not, in anyway, undermine it, as described below.
Although California's jurisprudence recognizes a broader set of classifications
as deserving of special protection than does federal constitutional law -for exam-
ple, despite the holding of San Antonio Independent SchoolDistrict v. Rodriguez21 at
the federal level, wealth can still be a suspect dassification in some contexts, as dari-
fled in the second Serrano case22 -not every distinction made by the state deserves
application of strict scrutiny. That is not surprising. Most laws make some dis-
tinctions-including laws that may affect fundamental interests like education.
For example, education laws traditionally distinguish by age. Fundamental inter-
ests are not absolute, and not every classification or distinction applied to them is
problematic. As explained in Romer v. Evans:
[T]he equal protection of the laws must coexist with the prac-
tical necessity that most legislation classifies for one purpose
or another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or
persons.23
20. See id. (citing John E. Coons et a., Educational Opportunity.'A Workable Constitutional Testfor State
Financial Structures, 57 CAL. L. REV. 305,388 (1969)).
21. 411 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1973).
22. Serrano 11, 557 P2d 929, 951-52 (Cal. 1976).
23. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
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While Romer is a federal decision, the point stands: legislation classifies,
and not all classifications are equally problematic. Here, most post-Serrano cases
examined suspect dassifications like race or wealth.24 Even the dosest cases do
not support the claim of SB 277 opponents that Serrano means that SB 277
should be reviewed for constitutional deficiencies under a strict scrutiny standard.
In King v. McMahon,25 California's First District Court of Appeal, referring to
Darces v. Woods,26 highlighted that
Darces, although advocating a more flexible approach to equal
protection analysis, nevertheless took pains to connect the classifi-
cation with more traditional indicia of a suspect dass-national
origin and ancestry. According to the court:
We have thus far emphasized the reason appellant's
children constitute a discrete minority-their inabil-
ity to control their parents' conduct. Equally crucial
to our holding is the fact that appellant's citizen chil-
dren are classified on the basis of an immutable
trait-they cannot forsake their birth into an undoc-
umented family. 
27
Both King and Darces considered access to the right to receive state financial
benefits. In Darces, children were denied welfare benefits because their undocu-
mented siblings were living in the same house.28 The court applied strict scrutiny
to invalidate this state action.29 SB 277 opponents argue that the justification for
strict scrutiny cited by the Darces court-that the children in question did not ask
to be deprived of these benefits, but were suffering because of a choice made by
their parents-applies with equal force to children who did not ask to be deprived
of vaccinations and, by application of SB 277, an education.
Yet the King court rebuts this argument, by properly focusing the inquiry on
whether the basis of the discrimination was an immutable characteristic.3" In King,
plaintiffs argued that the decision whether to place children with relatives-as op-
posed to placing them with unrelated families-should be subject to strict scruti-
24. See Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 551 P.2d 28 (Cal. 1976). Other cases, like Butt v. State, 842 P.2d
1240, 1257-58 (Cal. 1992), focused on not providing minimal services to a large group of students,
which is a different issue.
25. King v. McMahon, 186 Cal. App. 3d 648 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
26. Darces v. Woods, 679 P.2d 458 (Cal. 1984) (en banc).
27. King, 186 Cal App. 3d at 657.
28. Darces, 679 P.2d at 460.
29. Id. at 469.
30. King, 186 Cal App. 3d at 658.
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ny.31 The court rejected the application of strict scrutiny, reasoning that foster
care placement is not an immutable trait. As the excerpt above highlights, King
emphasized that the court in Darces had applied strict scrutiny not only because
children have no control over the choices of their parents-the argument cited by
vaccine opponents-but also because discrimination was occurring on the basis of
immutable characteristics.32 Immutable characteristics were not present in the
facts of the King case.33 Similarly, the parental choice not to vaccinate has noth-
ing to do with any immutable trait: It is a voluntary choice by the parents that is
unconnected to anything resembling national origin or ancestry.
Even if the opposition to vaccine is based on a religious belief, that would
not be an immutable characteristic: Both federal jurisprudence and state law al-
low limiting potentially harmful conduct even if religiously motivated. On the
federal level, under Employment Division v. Smith,34 a neutral law of general ap-
plication can apply to those with religious objections. On both the federal3" and
at the state level 6 statutes criminalizing, for example, female circumcision are not
problematic, even if the act is religiously motivated. To take a less extreme exam-
ple, Prince v. Massachusetts upheld child labor law against a challenge based on Je-
hovah Witnesses' sincere belief in the importance of having children proselytize,
because conduct can be regulated, even if religiously motivated.37 Religious iden-
tity may be immutable, but behavior-especially harmful behavior-is not, even
when it is motivated by religion.
Refusal to vaccinate is a choice that imposes risks on others, because unvac-
cinated children are themselves at much higher risk of contracting preventable
diseases than vaccinated children.38 Moreover, communities with lower rates of
immunization are at much higher risk of outbreaks.39 Acting in ways that create
31. Id. at 651-52.
32. In Darces, the court noted that the equal protection clause had been violated because "innocent
children cannot be explicitly disadvantaged on the basis of their status of birth." Darces, 679 P.2d
at 471.
33. King, 186 CaL App. 3d at 658.
34. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888-90 (1990).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 116(2012).
36. E.g. GA. CODEANN. § 16-5-27 (2013).
37. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
38. See Daniel R Feikin et al., Individual and Community Risks of Measles and Pertussis Associated With
Personal Exemptions to Immunization, 284 JAMA 3145, 3147-49 (2000); Jason M. Glanz et a.,
Parental Refusal of Pertussis Vaccination L Associated With an Increased Risk fPertussis Infection in
Children, 123 PEDIATRICS 1446,1449-50 (2009).
39 Aamer Imdad et al., Religious Exemptions for Immunization and Risk of Pertussis in New York State,
2000-2011, 132 PEDIATRICS 37, 38 (2013); Saad B. Omer et al., Geographic Clustering of
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a risk to others is not an immutable characteristic, and regulation that treats peo-
ple behaving in a manner that creates risk to others differently from those who do
not create such risk does not violate equal protection. This type of distinction is
not a suspect classification and thus does not trigger strict scrutiny.
Behavior that imposes risks on others can and should be regulated. For ex-
ample, the state can and does regulate one's ability to drink and drive; while you
are free to drink, the state can penalize you if you drive while under the influence,
because that behavior creates a risk.4" You have the right to refuse treatment for
tuberculosis, but the state may quarantine you as a consequence of the infection
risk you pose to others-even though no one contests the fact that freedom from
restraint is a fundamental interest.41
In this context, parents who choose not to vaccinate are more like those who
choose to drink and drive than they are those who are members of an ethnic
group. They have no more claim of discrimination than does the Association
Against Discriminating on the Basis of Alcohol Consumption (ADOBAC).42
If the parent wanted to send the child to school clearly ill, there is no argu-
ment that the school could prevent that, and the state can regulate to protect
other children from the illness. This is not prevented by Serrano. Acting
preemptively to prevent an attending child from falling ill-by requiring vac-
cination, which reduces the chances of illness by up to 97 percent (for two doses
of MMR43)-is likewise permissible.
We could even push the discussion further and highlight that Serrano gen-
erally does not cover behavioral choices. If parents wanted to send a child to
school naked, the school could prevent that, even if there is no risk to others, and
Serrano would not apply. Similarly, Serrano does not apply when parents want to
send the children to school unvaccinated.
Nonmedical Exemptions to School Immunization Requirements and Associations With Geographic
Clustering ofPertussis, 168 AM.J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1389,1394-95 (2008).
40 See Charles E. Phelps, Control ?fAlcohol-Involved Driving Through Impersonal Prevention, 14
ALCOHOL HEALTH &RES. WORLD 52,53 (1990).
41 City of Newark v. J.S., 652 A2d 265, 274 (Super. Ct. NJ. 1993). For a discussion of the
longstanding interest the state has in protecting the well-being of children, even in light of compet-
ing interests, see Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 13 ("[P]olice power concerns are substantially
broader in the case of children. Not only is the state concerned with containing public health risks.
•. but it is even more fimdamentally concerned with promoting the overall healthy development
and socialization of those who will become tomorrow's adults.").
42. A purely fictional association.
43. Measles, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/
measles/vaccination.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/DT9N-L93D].
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While a minority of parents may have religious reasons to reject vaccination
(the PBE covered religious exemptions as well), and religion is a suspect classifi-
cation, the evidence is that most people who do not vaccinate do not base the de-
cision on religious reasons.44 A minority of those who reject vaccines may do so
for religious reasons, but SB 277 does not target that minority; it is a neutral law
of general applicability, and therefore constitutional under our federal First
Amendment jurisprudence. 4
Existing jurisprudence thus teaches us that Serrano would not apply to the
category of differing vaccination status, if there were such a category, under an
equal protection heading. Nor would it prevent the state from imposing school
immunization requirements-with no nonmedical exemption required.
Although education is a fundamental interest, it is not, and has never been,
an unregulated sphere. California has an entire education code and regulates
schools in many aspects. Post-Serrano cases naturally brought challenges against
some of those regulations, testing the boundaries of the doctrine. I have found no
case in which Serrano led to the striking down of a health and safety regulation.
Regulations that further access to education and prevent disruption of education
are usually upheld.
Most notably, in Montalvo v. Madera46 a junior high school student at-
tacked the validity of a school regulation limiting the length of his hair. The
school justified the regulation as necessary to prevent disruption of education.47
The court upheld the restriction, deferring to the school authorities' judgment.48
Note that this regulation focuses on a limitation that is not connected to preser-
vation of life or the prevention of immediate severe harm. Furthermore, it was
not a state law enjoying the aura of legitimacy that being passed by a democrati-
cally elected legislature confers. Nonetheless, the regulation was upheld, and Ser-
rano not applied, because school and state authorities may regulate schools to
promote orderly conduct, health, and safety. This is exactly what school immun-
ization requirements do.
The next relevant case ended in a settlement and was never published. One
site explains it as follows:
44. Reiss, supra note 13, at 1570-88.
45. Id. at 1562-63; Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 13, at 7-8. Note that California does not have a
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which may raise additional questions on this score.
46. Montalvo v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 21 Cal. App. 3d 323, 337 (Cal. Ct. App.
1971).
47. Id. at 327.
48. Id. at 330-31.
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In 1999, several California organizations filed a school funding
case, Williams v. State, in state superior court on behalf of a class of
students attending substandard schools. The complaint cited inade-
quate, unsafe, and unhealthy facilities, a shortage of qualified teachers,
missing libraries, a lack of instructional materials, and overcrowded
schools that resulted in a staggered and shortened school year (togeth-
er known as Concept 6). The state filed cross-claims against 18 school
districts, but in 2000 plaintiffs won a motion to sever and stay pro-
ceedings on the cross-claims.
The court granted class certification in 2001, the Williams plain-
tiffs released their experts' reports in 2002, and the trial was scheduled
to begin in 2004. Instead, in August 2004, the parties announced a
settlement-later approved by the court-to: (1) provide $800 million
over the next several years for school repairs; (2) create a School Facili-
ties Needs Assessment program; (3) create standards for instructional
materials and facilities; (4) require a complaint process for inadequate
instructional materials, teacher vacancies, and emergency facilities
problems; (5) intervene in schools ranked in the bottom 30% under
the 2003 Academic Performance Index if instructional materials and
facilities standards are not met; (6) streamline California credentialing
for out-of-state credentialed teachers; (7) allocate about $140 million
for instructional materials in 2004-2005; and several other provi-
sions.49
In other words, these plaintiffs used Serrano to attack schools that were, in-
ter alia, "unsafe, and unhealthy-underscoring the importance of health and
safety as a precondition to education.0
Unsurprisingly, disease outbreaks also undermine education. During an
outbreak, students who are not vaccinated (including children who cannot be
vaccinated for legitimate medical reasons) are kept out of school, both for their
own safety and to contain the outbreak.1 Those students' educations are clearly
interrupted. A dassroom in which a large number of students are absent will not
be able to conduct business as usual, especially as children come back and need to
49. Historical Background Serrano v. Priest, NAT'L EDUC. ACCESS NETWORK,
http://www.schoolfunding.info/states/ca/lit ca.php3 (last updated Mar. 2011)
[http://perma.cc/AF28-9UGC].
50. See alsoJeannie Oakes &Martin Lipton, "Schools That Shock the Conscience"- Williams v. California and
the Strugglefor Education on Equal Terms Ffty YearsAfter Brown, 11 ASIAN LJ. 234,236-37 (2004).
51. See, e.g., Liz Szabo, Measles Outbreak Raises Question of Vaccine Exemptions, USA TODAY (Jan.
23, 2015, 8:45 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/01/21/disneyland-measles-
schools-outbreak/22106151 [http://perma.cc/YY64-YJNL].
63 UCLA L. REV. Disc. 98 (2015)
catch up, often at different times, requiring teacher attention and focus. Out-
breaks also consume valuable resources, especially limited time from school ad-
ministrators and nurses, who need to identify and track the students at risk.
Because resources are finite, that time has to come from elsewhere, at the cost of
other activities. If teachers fall ill, that can also disrupt education. Teachers, too,
deserve better than to be sick and potentially harmed by preventable illnesses. Of
course, the sick students themselves miss school. In addition, a child may die
from such a disease, or be disabled in a way that prevents or limits their subse-
quent education. In other words, just as disease outbreaks impose costs and
harms on public health officials and society2 and divert resources from other im-
portant objectives,3 they also impose costs on schools and disrupt education.
As mentioned above, vaccination refusal increases the risk of outbreaks.
There is abundant evidence that easier-to-obtain exemptions lead to lower vac-
cination rates4 and that having fewer barriers to obtaining exemptions is con-
nected with higher rates of preventable disease.55 State exemption policies can
directly affect the degree to which schools are protected against outbreaks,6 and
outbreaks directly impact education. The suggestion that Serrano limits the abil-
ity of the state to impose regulations aimed at preventing outbreaks goes against
its spirit and goal, actually undermining the right to education rather than pro-
moting it.
Although there are no California cases on point, a New York case examined
the tension between the right to education and a requirement for vaccination. In
deciding In re Viemeister,7 New York's Court of Appeals-which, despite the
name, is its highest court-examined whether an immunization requirement (at
52. See generally Charlotte A Moser et al., Funding the Costs of Disease Outbreaks Caused by Non
Vaccination, 43J.L. MED. &ETHICS (forthcoming 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2445610.
53. Id
54. See Nina R Blank et at, Exempting Schoolckildren From Immunizations: States W'th Few Barriers
HadHighest Rates ofNonmedicalExemptions, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1282,1282 (July2013); Walter A
Orenstein & Alan R. Hinman, The Immunization System in the United States-the Role of School
Immunization Laws, 17 VACCINE S19, S20 (1999).
55. Saad B. Omer et al., Nonmedical Exemptions to School Immunization Requirements: Secular Trends
andAssociation fState Policies With Pertussis Incidence, 296 JAMA 1757, 1762 (2006).
56. See also W. David Bradford & Anne Mandich, Some State Vaccination Lawvs Contribute to Greater
Exemption Rates and Disease Outbreaks in the United States, 34 HEALTH AFF. 1383, 1383 (Aug.
2015).
57. In re Viemeister, 72 N.E. 97, 98 (N.Y. 1904). For another view that attacking SB 277 based on the
right to education is unlikely to succeed, see Michelle M. Mello et at, Shfiting Vaccination Politics
The End of Personal-BeliefExemptions i  Cal fornia, 373 NEW ENG. J. MED. 785 (Jul. 27, 2015),
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp1508701.
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a time, moreover, when there was no current outbreak) violated the state's explicit
constitutional right to an education. The court concluded that:
The right to attend the public schools of the state is necessarily
subject to some restrictions and limitations in the interest of the pub-
lic health .... If vaccination strongly tends to prevent the transmis-
sion or spread of this disease [smallpox], it logically follows that
children may be refused admission to the public schools until they
have been vaccinated. 58
In other words, if vaccination prevents and minimizes the risk of transmis-
sion of harmful diseases, it may be required as a condition of school attendance,
because of the need to protect the health of other students.
59
The closest California case opponents could use would be Phipps v. Saddle-
back Valley Unified School District.6" In this case, the court overturned a require-
ment that a child with acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) be
homeschooled. But the grounds for the court's decision to uphold a permanent
injunction against the school district61 did not involve a constitutional argument
for access under Serrano. Rather, the decision rested on the lack of evidence for a
risk of infection and examined the use of administrative discretion. It cannot
stand for the proposition that risk of infection does not justify limiting access. In
Phipps, no such risk was found. Finally, although not discussed explicitly in the
decision, Phipps would be easily distinguished because having AIDS is, sadly, still
an immutable characteristic, while being unvaccinated without medical justifica-
tion is not. Parents of a child infected with AIDS cannot change their child's
condition, as much as they would like to, since AIDS currently remains incura-
ble. Just as race or ethnicity, a child and her family have no choice in the matter.
II. SB 277WITHSTANDS THE COMPELLING INTERESTAND LEAST
RESTRICTIVE MEANs REQUIREMENTS
Even if one assumes-and, as explained above, this would probably be
erroneous-that SB 277 is subject to strict scrutiny, there is reason to think
that it would meet that standard. The federal constitution almost certainly
does not require holding school immunization laws to this standard, not even
in relation to religious exemptions (The California Constitution's position on
58. In re Viemeister, 72 N.E. at 98.
59. And unlike SB 277, the New York law was upheld even without a medical exemption.
60. 204 Cal. App. 3d 1110 (Cal Ct. App. 1988).
61. "'[Slubject to appropriate medical exam at least every six months."' Id. at 1116.
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this has not yet been addressed by the courts).6 2 In Workman v. Mingo County
Board of Education, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that school
immunization requirements with no nonmedical exemptions would survive
even strict scrutiny, because protecting against infectious disease is a compel-
ling interest.63
This decision seems to be eminently justified. All the diseases we vaccinate
against carry substantial risks, which far outweigh vaccines' small risks.64 Schools
are areas of high transmission,6" and again, communities with low vaccination
rates are at much higher risk of disease.66 Minimizing the risks of these danger-
ous diseases to children in school and to those they may infect (for example,
newborns or the elderly) is potentially a matter of life and death.67 There are few
interests stronger than that.
SB 277 creates a situation in which there is no nonmedical exemption from
school immunization requirements. Is this a narrowly tailored solution? The vast
majority of states offer a religious exemption, and many a PBE or "philosophical"
exemption, alongside the requirement to vaccinate. Furthermore, a law with no
,tout," or a law without a nonmedical exemption, carries its own risks, as I have
addressed elsewhere:
Absent an exemption, parents may resort to extreme measures. They
may decide that the only way to avoid harming their children is to falsi-
fy records. With exemptions, unvaccinated children are known, and
schools typically exclude them if there is an outbreak-something for
which state laws provide. This exclusion in the face of an outbreak
would not be possible if unvaccinated students are not accurately identi-
fied. If no personal belief exemptions were allowed, parents may vac-
62. See Reiss &Weithorn, supra note 13, at 43.
63. Workman v. Mingo Cnty. B. of Educ., 419 F. App'x 348, 353 (4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 590 (2011) ("[T]he state's wish to prevent the spread of communicable diseases
dearly constitutes a compelling interest.").
64. Michael H. Shapiro, Updating Constitutional Doctrine: An Extended Response to the Critique ¢f
Compulsory Vaccination, 12 YALEJ. HEALTH POLY L. &ETHICS 87, 122-37 (2012) (explaining
the importance of the hepatitis B vaccine); Reiss &Weithom, supra note 13, at 7-8.
65. Muireann Brennan et al., Evidence for Transmission c Pertussis in Schools, Massachusetts, 1996:
Epidemiologic Data Supported by Pulsed-Field Gel Electrophoresis Studies, 181 J. INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 201, 214 (2000); Dieter Schenzle, An Age-Structured Model of Pre- and Post- Vaccination
Measles Transmission, 1 UVIAJ. MATHEMATICS APPLIED MED. &BIOLOGY 169 (1984).
66. See Feikin et al., supra note 38; Omer et al, supra note 39.
67. The one exception to the risk of infection is tetanus, also induded in California's immunization
requirements. Tetanus is not a transmittable disease. But as a practical matter, since the tetanus
vaccine is bundled with other diseases and not available separately, it makes no difference. If
children are required to be vaccinated against diphtheria and pertussis-both communicable--they
will also get a tetanus vaccine. It's not an additional requirement.
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cinate their children and then use one of the untested, unsupported
"detoxification" protocols suggested by antivaccine extremists. This
process could be less than healthy for these children. Additionally, par-
ents may decide to homeschool only out of concerns about vaccines,
not out of desire, and maybe without being truly ready and able to do
so. That would also not necessarily be in the child's best interest.68
These concerns hold, but they do not make SB 277 unconstitutional. Nor
do they even make it a fundamentally flawed option: No law is perfect, and stat-
utes often have to be compared with the status quo. SB 277 is better than the ex-
isting, easily obtained exemption that led some communities to have unacceptably
high rates of exemptions, and offers many important benefits, making it worthy of
support.69
In terms of constitutionality, the question is how narrowly the law should be
tailored. If the goal is vaccination rates that are as high as possible, a policy with
no exemptions is that which achieves the goal.7" The highest vaccination rates
in our country are in Mississippi, one of the few states without a nonmedical
exemption.71 And as mentioned above, higher vaccination rates mean fewer
outbreaks. Mississippi has not had a case of measles in twenty years and had fif-
ty-four cases of pertussis in 2014, with ten through August 8, 2015.72 By con-
trast, California, with its relatively easy to obtain PBE, had 136 cases of measles
from the end of 2014 through April 2015.7" It had 11,203 cases of pertussis in
68. Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Vaccines, Measles, and Rights, 2 WAKE FOREST L. REV. COMMON
L. 138 (2015) (internal citations omitted), http://wakeforestlawreview.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Vaccines -Measles- and- Rights -by-Dorit- Rubinstein -Reiss-
PDFI.pdf.
69. See Mello et al., supra note 57.
70. See Todd C. Frankel, Mississippi-Yes, Mississippi-Has the Nation's Best Child Vaccination
Rate. Here's W'hy, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/storyline/wp/2015/01/30/mississippi-yes-mississippi-has-the-nations-best-child-
vaccination-rate-heres-why [http://perma.cc/57TQ-PXAD] ("The secret of Mississippi's
success stems from a strong public health program and-most importantly-a strict
mandatory vaccination law that lacks the loopholes found in almost every other state.").
West Virginia also has very, very low rates of exemptions. Ranee Seither et al., Morbidity and
Mortality Weekly Report, CTRS. FOR DISEASE PREVENTION & CONTROL (Oct. 17, 2014),
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtn-l/mm6341al.htm?s cid=mm6341a1 e#Tab2
[http://perma.cc/U7X-MK5W].
71. Frankel, supra note 70.
72. Not/iable Diseases and Mortality Tables, 64 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. ND-544,
ND-482 (July 17,2015), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/wk/mm6427md.pdf
73. IMMUNIZATION BRANCH, CAL. DEP'T PUB. HEALTH, CALIFORNIA MEASLES
SURVEILLANCE UPDATE APRIL 17, 2015, at 1 (2015), https://www.cdph.ca.gov/
Healthlnfo/discond/Documents/Measles update 4-17-2015 public.pdf.
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2014 and 3404 by August 2015.74 Three infants died of pertussis in 2014 in
California, and one has died as of June 2015.7" Even accounting for the differ-
ence in population size between the two states, these are stark differences.
Certainly, easy to obtain exemptions lead to lower vaccination rates, which
increase the risk of outbreaks. Ideally, one would be able to mathematically pre-
dict the level of difficulty in obtaining vaccination exemptions that would effec-
tively prevent outbreaks, but we do not have that information; right now, we are
operating with uncertainty. How broad an exemption is justified in order to pre-
vent a death? And should it really be the courts' job to second-guess the legisla-
ture's risk assessment i such a situation of uncertainty? My view is no. Since
there are no good criteria to determine what is appropriately "narrow" in these
circumstances-since it depends on the value put on a life-the democratically
elected legislature should have leeway to reflect in its policy the state's values.
In addition, as discussed in Part IV, SB 277 does leave parents with options.
As such, it is narrowly tailored to the goal of removing the risk that unvaccinated
children pose to their dassmates: Unvaccinated children cannot congregate in
ways that undermine herd immunity and increase the risk of outbreaks, but they
have access to several respectable educational opportunities that the state offers.
And rather than forcing parents to vaccinate, the state is preserving their right to
leave their children unvaccinated-but requiring them to act to reduce the risk
that decision poses to others.
III. WHOSE RIGHTTOACCESS? SB277 PROTECTSTHE RIGHT OF
ACCESS OF THOSE WHO CANNOT BEVACCINATED
Senator Ben Allen, before the Senate Judiciary Committee, raised another
powerful argument against attacks on SB 277's constitutionality.76 Senator Allen
reminded the Committee what the result of easy-to-get PBEs is: schools with
low vaccination rates. Such schools create real risks for children with medical
contraindications, specifically those who cannot be vaccinated.
74. CAL. DEP'T PUB. HEALTH, PERTUSSIS REPORT AUGUST 3, 2015, at 2 tbL1 (Aug. 3, 2015),
http://www.cdph.ca.gov/programs/"mmunize/Documents/Pertussis%/2Oreport%/2O8-3-2015.pdf
These numbers are drawn from California's Department of Health report, on the assumption that
they are closest to the ground and have the best numbers on this issue.
75. Id. at 1.
76. See Jenny Jiang, Transcript: CA Sen. Benjamin Allen's Opening Statement on SB 277 Before the Senate
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For example, in the struggle over SB 277, the father of seven-year-old Rhett
Krawitt, a leukemia survivor who remained unprotected from some diseases,
talked about the parents' reluctance and hesitation to send Rhett to school before
he could be vaccinated again given the high rate of exemptions.77 Rhett could
not be vaccinated because of his cancer treatments and was very vulnerable to a
preventable disease such as measles. In essence, easily obtained exemptions, by
creating an environment more prone to outbreaks, make schools less safe for
children such as Rhett-putting them directly at risk of preventable disease.
In that sense, an extremely loose exemption undermines access to school for
those who cannot be vaccinated or for whom vaccines are not as effective for
medical reasons.7" The parents of such children-cancer survivors, children with
transplants, children allergic to vaccine components-do not have a choice.
They cannot vaccinate their children, who often are especially vulnerable to the
risk of infection. Low vaccination rates undermine these children's right to access
education; limiting or removing exemptions improves it.
The state has to choose between the current system, which allows open ac-
cess to schools to unvaccinated children, and providing safe access to children
who cannot be vaccinated for medical reasons. Between these groups, it is the
latter-the children with medical conditions that prevent vaccination-that is
more similar to the groups California's constitution most clearly protects, those
with immutable traits. The barrier to access is not of their making, and not one
about which they have a choice. This is the group whose access should take pri-
ority and be granted special protection by the state and the courts.
Parents who choose not to vaccinate may be motivated by real fears about
vaccines. But their fears tend to go against overwhelming scientific evidence.
Protecting the access of those making counterevidentiary choices at the expense
of access for those who do not actually have a choice is problematic.
77. See Tamar Lewin, Sick Child's Father Seeks Vaccination Requirement in California, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/29/us/father-of-boy-with-leukemia-asks-
califomia-school-officials-to-bar-unvaccinated-students.html [http://perma.cc/73LR-LTL7].
78. For example, in spring 2015 a woman taking medication that weakened her immune system died
from measles pneumonia in Washington State. Press Release, Wash. State Dep't Health,
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IV. SB 277 DOES NOT REMOVE CHOICE, THOUGH IT LIMaTS IT
Opponents of SB 277 presented the legislation as removing parental choice
and effectively forcing them to vaccinate. But SB 277 excludes from vaccination
requirements a number of educational alternatives to public and private school-
ing. It does not require immunization of children schooled at home, even if their
parents choose to conduct the homeschooling by filing as a private school.79 It al-
so allows children to enroll in home-based independent study through their pub-
lic school without being subject to immunization requirements. "
At the same time, SB 277 does condition attending private or public school
on meeting immunization requirements, and in this, it imposes a limit on paren-
tal freedom: Parents can no longer send children to school unvaccinated. Is this
removal of choice?
Consider for a moment why a parent may decide to homeschool. Several of
the reasons mentioned on homeschooling associations' sites relate to family inter-
actions and lifestyle. S But other reasons include "[a]cademic excellence, physical
safety" and fifty-five other safety issues that include bullying and gangs, or not be-
ing subject to the school curriculum or hours.1
2
Parents concerned about safety may feel they have no choice, and par-
ents who oppose the school's curriculum may feel that it is being imposed on
them. But the state is not required to increase guards at a school, or to change
curricula to allow those parents to avoid homeschooling. Basically, the state
sets requirements and provides conditions in school that the legislature or school
administration concludes are adequate to protect children and allow an appropri-
ate education, within budgetary constraints. There are constitutional limits on
those choices, as Serrano demonstrates (and as addressed in Part I), but the state
has substantial discretion in setting them. Parents who are sufficiently unhappy
with state laws and regulations may choose to homeschool, and sometimes, they
79. S.B. 277, 2015-16 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015), ch. 35, 2015 Cal. Stat. 91, sec. 2, § 120335(f),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/15-16/bill/sen/sb 0251-0300/sb 277 bill 20150630 chaptered.pdf
(This section does not apply to a pupil in a home-based private school or a pupil who is enrolled in an
independent study program pursuant o Article 5.5 . . . and does not receive classroom-based
instruction.").
80. Id.
81. See FrequentyAsked Questions, CAL. HOMESCH. NETWORK, http://wwwcalfforniahomeschoolnet
/how-to-homeschool/faq [http://permacc/4PDR-XDG3] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).
82. Lillian Jones, Considering Homeschooling: Introduction to Homeschooling, HOMESCHOOL
ASS'N CAL., http://www.hsc.org/homeschoolinghelp/considering-homeschooling.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20150905122647/http://www.hsc.org/homeschoolinghelp/
considering-homeschooling.html] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).
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will see the choice as constrained and as a choice between two evils. It is still, how-
ever, a choice.
The same is true regarding the choice to follow school immunization re-
quirements. Parents do have a choice: They can vaccinate, protecting their chil-
dren against disease, following the state requirements. Or, if sufficiently hostile to
the requirement, they can choose one of the available options. There are several
choices available. Parents can choose to homeschool as a private school, by filing
an affidavit, 3 alone or as part of a group of families (the statute was amended to al-
low a group of families to homeschool together). While hard for working parents,
this decision can still be made feasible through the option of collaborating with
other families. Or parents can hire an accredited tutor. 4 Or parents can enroll
their children in an independent study program offered by a public school.
These options may be inconvenient or challenging for some families. They
may feel constrained and unhappy about the choice. They may correctly see it as
limiting their child's educational opportunity. They may see it as a choice be-
tween evils, as unbearably hard. But they do have a choice. They can choose to
protect their child from disease and send that child to school, or they can choose
to take advantage of one of the other options offered by the state.
The state does not change its curriculum to accommodate parents so hostile
to it that they would rather homeschool; the state does not have to avoid reasona-
ble health regulations, such as vaccination requirements, to accommodate parents
so frightened of vaccination (usually based on incorrect information)5 that they
would rather homeschool 
8 6
CONCLUSION
SB 277 generated substantial controversy. There can be legitimate debate
on whether removing exemptions to school immunization requirements is ap-
propriate from a policy standpoint,7 but opponents daiming that the bill is un-
83. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 33190 (West 2009).
84. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48224 (West 2006).
85. See Paul A. Offit, DEADLY CHOICES 105-55 (2011); Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 13, at
Part IV (B).
86. It should be remembered that SB 277 does not remove medical exemptions. Children with valid
medical reasons not to vaccinate are not required to vaccinate under the law. In fact, limiting
exemptions to these children should lead to higher immunization rates, better herd immunity, and
better protection for them.
87. Compare Daniel A- Salmon et al., Making Mandatory Vaccination Truly Compulsory: Well
Intentioned but Ill Conceived, 15 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 872 (Aug. 2015), with Mello et
al., supra note 57.
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constitutional are wrong. SB 277 does not infringe upon California's right to ed-
ucation and it also fits within our federal jurisprudence relating to vaccination re-
quirements. In fact, it reinforces the right to education, by protecting school-
schoolchildren from disease, which is a precondition to receiving the education to
which they are entitled.

